Getting China Wrong
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- Create Date：2022-06-23 09:19:40
- Update Date：2025-09-07
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- Author：Aaron L. Friedberg
- ISBN：1509545123
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Horace Derwent
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IntroductionThe history of the last half-century of relations betweenChina and the West1 can be briefly summarized。 TheUnited States and the other liberal democracies openedtheir doors to China in the belief that， by doing so， theywould cause its system to converge more closely withtheir own。 As anticipated， access to the markets，resources， technology， educational systems， andmanagerial know-how of the advanced industrial nationsof Western Europe， North America， and East Asia helpedChina grow ri IntroductionThe history of the last half-century of relations betweenChina and the West1 can be briefly summarized。 TheUnited States and the other liberal democracies openedtheir doors to China in the belief that， by doing so， theywould cause its system to converge more closely withtheir own。 As anticipated， access to the markets，resources， technology， educational systems， andmanagerial know-how of the advanced industrial nationsof Western Europe， North America， and East Asia helpedChina grow richer more rapidly than would otherwisehave been possible。 But trade and societal interaction didnot yield the broader benefits for which the democracieshad hoped。 Instead of a liberal and cooperative partner，China has become an increasingly wealthy and powerfulcompetitor， repressive at home and aggressive abroad。When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s， theUnited States adopted a two-part strategy for dealingwith China。 On the one hand， in a continuation andexpansion of policies that began twenty years earlier withthe Nixon/Kissinger opening to Beijing， successive USadministrations sought to promote “engagement”:ever-deepening commercial， diplomatic， scientific，educational， and cultural ties between China and theWest。 At the same time， together with a collection ofallies and strategic partners， from the mid-1990sWashington worked to maintain a favorable balance ofmilitary power in what has now come to be referred toas the Indo-Pacific region。 While most non-Asiandemocracies did not participate actively in the balancingportion of US strategy， all embraced engagement， andespecially its economic component， with vigor andenthusiasm。The two elements of this dual-edged strategy wereexpected to work together。 Balancing would preservestability and deter aggression， even as China grew richerand stronger。 Meanwhile， engagement would transformthe country in ways that reduced the danger it mightsomeday pose a threat to the interests of the UnitedStates and its democratic allies。 By welcoming Beijing intothe US-dominated， post-Cold War international system，American policy-makers hoped to persuade China’sleaders that their interests lay in preserving the existingorder， adapting to its rules and adopting its values，rather than seeking to modify or overthrow it。 DrawingChina fully into an increasingly integrated global economywas also expected to accelerate its transition away fromstate-directed economic planning and towards a moreopen， market-driven model of development。 Finally， USand other Western leaders hoped that by encouragingthe growth of a middle class， the spread of liberal ideas，and strengthening the rule of law and the institutions ofcivil society， engagement would lead eventually toliberalizing political reforms。Optimism on all of these counts reached a peak at theturn of the twentyfirst century with Beijing’s accession tothe World Trade Organization （WTO） and its full， formalincorporation into the Western-built global economicsystem。 The subsequent two decades – and， inparticular， the years since the 2008 financial crisis –have been marked by a darkening mood andaccumulating evidence that things have not goneaccording to plan。 Instead of moving steadily towardsgreater openness and more reliance on markets， asmost observers predicted and expected， Beijing hasexpanded its use of state-directed trade， technologypromotion， and industrial policies。 Despite the ChineseCommunist Party （CCP） regime’s ceaseless rhetoric aboutthe glories of globalization and the wonders of “win-wincooperation，” these policies now threaten the futureprosperity of the advanced industrial nations。Rather than loosen up， the Chinese party-state hascracked down on its own citizens， stifling the slightesthint of dissent， laying the foundations for a pervasive，nationwide high-tech surveillance system， and consigningat least a million of the country’s Uighur Muslims toforced labor and concentration camps。 China today ismore repressive than at any time since the 1989Tiananmen Square massacre and arguably since theCultural Revolution of the 1960s。Finally， far from becoming a satisfied supporter of theinternational status quo， Beijing is now pursuing openlyrevisionist aims: it seeks to displace the United States asthe preponderant power in eastern Eurasia and hopeseventually to challenge its position as the world’s richest，strongest， most technologically advanced， and mostinfluential nation。 In addition to eroding the advantages inwealth and material power that the United States andthe other Western democracies have long enjoyed， Chinanow poses an explicit challenge to the efficacy， moralauthority， and supposed universality of the principles onwhich their political systems are based。 In the words ofa 2019 report by the European Union， China is a“systemic rival” that claims to have developed “alternativemodels of governance” superior to those put forward bythe liberal democratic West。2Why did the policy of engagement fail to achieve itsobjectives？ The simplest answer to this question is thatUS and other Western policy-makers misunderstood thecharacter of China’s domestic political regime: theyunderestimated the resilience， resourcefulness， andruthlessness of the CCP， misjudged the depths of itsresolve to retain domestic political power， and failed torecognize the extent and seriousness of its revisionistinternational ambitions。 Put plainly， engagement failedbecause its architects and advocates got China wrong。Even before the Cold War ended， China’s leadersbelieved that they were engaged in a life-and-deathstruggle with the democratic world， led by the UnitedStates。 As viewed from Beijing， offers of engagementwere merely a clever Western stratagem designed toweaken China by exposing its people to dangerousliberal ideas and unleashing societal forces that wouldlead eventually to irresistible pressures for politicalchange。 At the same time as they sought to subvert itssystem from within， American strategists were seen asaiming to contain China， preventing it from regaining itsrightful place in Asia by encircling it with allies andforward-based military forces。Faced with what it regarded as a deadly， double-edgedthreat， the CCP regime worked diligently to devise andimplement a counter-strategy of its own。 Highly flexibleand adaptive in their choice of means， Chinesestrategists have nevertheless been remarkably constantin their objectives。 For over thirty years now they havefound ways to exploit the opportunities afforded byengagement， expanding their nation’s economy， buildingup its scientific， technological， and military capabilities， andenhancing its influence in Western countries， while at thesame time maintaining and even reinforcing the Party’sgrip on Chinese society。 As their strength andself-confidence have grown， China’s rulers have begun tomove from a largely defensive posture in world affairs toan assertive and even aggressive external stance。 Albeitbelatedly， in the last several years this shift has sparkedconcern and the beginnings of a more forceful responsefrom the West。Judged against their respective aims， Beijing’s strategyhas thus far worked better than that of the UnitedStates and its democratic allies。 But the competitionbetween the two sides is far from over。 One reasonwhy China has done as well as it has to date isprecisely that its rivals have been so slow to react to itsadvances。 Where Beijing has been fixed in its ends butflexible in its means， the democracies have tended to berigid with respect to both， clinging to forlorn hopes andfailed policies。 If the liberal democracies can reset theirassumptions and expectations about China， abandon theirprevious passivity and start to regain the initiative， thequality of Beijing’s strategic reflexes will be put to thetest。 Confronted with a more alert and dynamicopponent， the CCP regime may be prone to seize up，doubling down on existing approaches in ways that couldprove counterproductive and potentially self-defeating。Indeed， there are already some signs that this hasstarted to happen。Subsequent chapters will examine both sides of thecomplex， multi-dimensional rivalry between China， on theone hand， and the democracies， led by the UnitedStates， on the other。The book’s opening chapters focus on the United States，the architect and prime mover behind the policy ofengagement， starting with an account of the policy’sorigins， from the latter stages of the Cold War to thedebate over China’s entry into the WTO at the end ofthe 1990s。 Contrary to what some critics have claimed，engagement was not merely a fool’s errand， a carelessand self-evident blunder with an obviously unachievableaim; nor was it simply the handiwork of greedy“globalists” in search of profits。 Rather it was theproduct of a unique set of historical circumstances thatprevailed at the end of the Cold War。 Chapter 1describes the confluence of deeply rooted ideologicalbeliefs， powerful material trends， and emerging interestgroup pressures that launched the United States on itsquixotic campaign to reshape China’s political system，economy， and grand strategy。Chapter 2 lays out three sets of rationales forengagement offered by US policy-makers during thecrucial decade of the 1990s。 An examination of thehistorical record confirms that， despite some recentrevisionism， a broad assortment of experts， officials， andpolitical leaders did， in fact， argue that engagementwould likely lead to China’s economic and politicalliberalization and its willing incorporation into the existing，US-dominated international order。Three subsequent chapters will address the centralquestion of why these expectations have not been met。Chapter 3 analyzes the Party’s persistent anxieties aboutpenetration and subversion， describes its unwaveringdetermination to maintain its domestic political monopoly，and traces the evolving mix of coercion， cooptation， andideological indoctrination through which it has been ablethus far to do so。As explained in Chapter 4， the CCP’s preoccupation withpower and its obsession with control are also essential tounderstanding the evolution of its economic policies。 Fromthe start of the process of “reform and opening up”under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s， CCP strategistshave regarded the market as a tool of the party-stateor， as one of Deng’s colleagues put it， a “bird in acage。” While they have been willing at times to affordgreater scope to market forces， contrary to theexpectations of most Western observers， the Party’s topleaders have never had any intention of proceedingdown the path towards full economic liberalization。 Itshould therefore come as no surprise that， in respondingto the challenge of markedly slower growth， in recentyears the regime has ignored the advice of mostWestern （and many Chinese） economists that it relax itsgrip， opting instead for policies that further enhance therole of the state at the expense of the market。Chapter 5 will make the case that， as is true of itsdomestic political and economic policies， theoutward-directed elements of China’s grand strategy arealso strongly shaped by the character of the CCPregime and its distinctive ideological worldview。 Followingthe collapse of the Soviet Union， Beijing faced aninternational system that it saw as profoundlythreatening， not only to its physical security but also toits very legitimacy。 While for a time China lacked thepower to challenge the status quo， the notion that itwould want nothing more than to be accepted as amember in good standing of the existing regional andglobal orders was always fanciful。 As their capabilitieshave grown， China’s leaders have gone over to theoffensive， pushing back at the meddlesome presence ofUS and allied military forces in their own backyard，challenging America’s position as the preeminent globalpower， and seeking to neutralize the threat posed bythe pervasiveness and continuing appeal of the liberaldemocratic ideals it espouses。What comes through plainly in each of these threedomains – political， economic， and strategic – is theconsistency of the CCP’s goals and the relentlessdetermination with which they have been sought bysuccessive generations of leaders。 Since taking power inlate 2012， Xi Jinping has felt emboldened to expressthose ends more openly and to pursue them moreforcefully than his predecessors。 Contrary to the way inwhich he is sometimes portrayed in the West， however，Xi does not represent a break from the past。 To thecontrary， he is following in the footsteps of his forebearsand attempting to attain the same objectives。For their part， the United States and its allies arepresently suspended between a set of old policies thathave not achieved the aims set for them and a new，not yet fully defined alternative strategy to guide theirfuture actions。 Before looking forward， Chapter 6 will lookback one last time， examining the question of whetherengagement’s failure was inevitable and explaining why ithas taken so long for Western policy-makers toacknowledge that it has， in fact， failed。The democracies now find themselves confronted， not bya cooperative partner， but by a powerful and hostilestate， deeply enmeshed in their societies and economies，and ruled by a technologically sophisticated， dictatorialregime that seeks to reshape the world in ways thatare threatening to their interests and inimical to theirvalues。 This reality is unpleasant but it is also undeniableand must be faced。 Continuing to engage with China onthe same terms as in the past will help it grow evenstronger and， instead of inducing positive change， suchan approach will only strengthen the hand andencourage the ambitions of the CCP regime。The book will close by laying out the main elements of anew strategy for meeting the challenge that Beijing nowposes。 Although there will be costs， the United Statesand its allies need to constrict engagement with Chinaand invest more in the capabilities necessary to balanceagainst its growing power。 Abandoning the illusorypost-Cold War goal of transforming the country byincorporating it into an all-inclusive international orderoperating on liberal principles， the democracies mustfocus instead on strengthening the sinews of a partialliberal system: an assembly of states that， whatevertheir differences， share a commitment to upholding anddefending the rights and freedoms on which theirsocieties are based。Notes1。 I will use the terms “West” and “liberaldemocracies” interchangeably。 Once confined to thetrans-Atlantic zone， liberal democracies can now befound in every region of the world。 These arecountries with popularly elected governments whosepowers are restrained by the rule of law and whichare committed to protecting the civil rights of all theircitizens。2。 Joint Communication to the European Parliament，the European Council， and the Council， “EU–China – AStrategic Outlook，” March 12， 2019， p。 1。 。。。more
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